CENTRAL BANK INTEREST RATE MONITOR

Walter Stanners         Home


Original date: 25 April 2003.         Graphs 1 - 3 updated: 26th January 2007.


Abstract:
Following on from the note entitled “The Function of the Central Bank”, this note brings the data up to date. It will be re-issued weekly. It will monitor the tendency of short-term interest rates, give the author's judgement on the likely movement of the central bank rate in the UK, US and Euorozone, and enable the reader to make his own judgement. An addendum shows that by the normal standards of statistical testing (which by their nature must always fall short of proof), the 3-month bank rate leads the changes announced by the central banks in their base rates.

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Introduction

The note entitled "The Function of the Central Bank" which is present on this website, concluded that "it is impossible to sustain the notion of skilful time-critical steering of the economy by the central bank, or even that the central bank does in fact determine short term interest rates. On the contrary, the proposition, that commercial short-term interest rates are in fact followed by the central bank, seems generally to be in accordance with the observed facts." The voluminous journalistic and political commentary on interest rate changes, not noticeably contradicted by academic voices, was characterised as "not scientific or objective description, but a practised rhetoric which is tailored to suit what is known to be an uncritical audience".

The evidence presented was a comparison of time-series for central bank rate, and the 3-month commercial rate, for the period from January 1995 to the time of drafting of the note, January 2002. The three currency zones treated were the UK, the US, and the EU Eurozone.

This note brings the data up to date, and the intention is to re-issue this note, nominally at weekly intervals. It recalls the remark in the previous note: "At the risk of appearing flippant, it might be said to be that, far from needing immense skill, any reasonably able child could look at the trend of US 3-month market rates, and issue his or her decision at intervals, as and when a quarter point or a half point adjustment to the base rate was necessary to keep up".

An addendum is added, which gives the results of some statistical work which arose in its preparation. Apart from the confirmatory nature of these results, they give rise to a datum or parameter which may aid the eye in judging the recent trends in short-term interest rates. This parameter is given in figures 1 to 3, the figures which will be updated at intervals.

In order to interpret these three figures, it is probably helpful, perhaps essential, to be familiar with the previous paper.


The data

Reference should be made to the previous note for more information on the provenance of the data. Briefly, it is taken from tables published daily by the Financial Times. Currently, these are Libor 3-month market rates. A table of official rates is also given daily, although these change only infrequently.

There is no reason to imagine that the central bank rate and the 3-month rate must run at the same absolute level - we are concerned only with the signal given by changes in the 3-month rate. Thus, in the previous paper, it was found helpful to lower the absolute level of the 3-month rate, for comparison with the bank rate level, by 0.325 percentage point for the US, 0.1 for the Euro, and 0.015 (effectively zero) for the pound. This is done in the graphs below.


Results

Each graph, one for each of the three zones, is accompanied by the author's impression of the "apparent tendency" signalled currently by recent trends in the 3-month rate, as seen by eye. Also given is the change in the 3-month rate since the day on which the lst bank rate step was published. The relevance of this parameter is the subject of the addendum. Since central banks have in the past few years tended to change the rate by a quarter or half of a percentage point, any absolute value of this parameter around or above this level might be regarded as significant, if appreciated in the statistical context discussed in the addendum.





Graph 1 - UK

Apparent tendency:

Base rate followed the market rate down in July 2003, but no sooner had it done so than the market signalled a reversal. The base rate followed 4 months later, November 2003, but not by enough to close the gap. After a three-month delay, it did so. The subsequent path delivered an upward signal as strong as those before the previous two base rate changes, and it was duly followed. Since, if anything, the 3-month rate responded by rising yet faster, another quarter-point increase in bank rate followed in one month. The subsequent slight sign of a pause in the 3-month rate was not maintained, and the rising signal was followed on 5th August. Since then, there there was at first no response by the 3-month rate. It seemed to be hovering around a "steady" signal. A sharp rise was soon reversed. From mid-April, however, a downward movement gathered momentum to the point where a quarter-point fall in the official rate rise was inevitable, or even overdue. It duly took place. The market then indicated a pause for a year, according to criteria used here. Although premature by those criteria, the base rate was increased by a quarter-point on 3 Aug. The reaction of the market over the next weeks was awaited. And although it is too early to tell, this was one of those rare occasions, in 11 years of observation of three banks, that the market responded to a bank decision in the conventionally related way, i.e., by immediately following it! By the normal criteria, the market rate then gave a strong signal of a virtually inevitable and indeed overdue base rate rise (and just possibly a half-point rise). The quarter-point base rate rise duly followed on 9th November. The preliminary market reaction since was non-committal, but the base rate was rashly raised another quarter-point on 11th Jan. It remained to be seen whether the UK market would treat this signal with the same indifference as the US market showed to the last Greenspan rise. But not so. The market rushed on, indicating the likelihood of a base-rate rise soon.

As from 11 Feb 2005, an approximate indication of the real (inflation adjusted) 3-month interest rate is given.

Press comment:

Financial Times 11th June 2004
"The Bank of England has spent seven months tip-toeing around the consumer but with yesterday's quarter point rise in the main interest rate the monetary policy committee has stamped its foot."

The bank rate rise was, as usual, covered in many, many column inches, touching all bases except the most boring and obvious one, the historical record of current and recent levels of actual interest rates.





Graph 2 - US

Apparent tendency:

After a period of stability lasting the best part of a year, the marked and accelerating rise of the 3-month rate beginning April 2004 made a bank rate increase virtually inevitable, and this duly took place. The signal remained upward. The Fed rate-rise to 1.5% on 10th August seemed premature (may have been done, according to one comentator, to justify previous Fed briefing)*. The pre-step-change rising trend of the 3-month rate (which began a month and a half before the Fed followed suit), was again acknowledged by a further step, the 3-month rate still rising, apparently unchecked. The signal to the Fed to make a further upward step was obeyed on 10th Nov (see letter to the FT below). The seven and a half month unbroken rise of the 3-month rate seems to be proceeding at the same fast pace, which if continued for only another week, would indicate a further quarter-point rise in Fed rate. Added 17 Dec 2004: The Fed took the hint on 14 Dec. The rise continued. On 2nd February it was answered by a quarter-point rise in the Fed rate, and again on 22nd March. On both occasions the rises were amply signalled here. The relentless rise continued and was answered by a Fed rate rise on 3rd May, and by another on 30th June. There is no sign of abatement, and no evidence that the Fed is leading this rise. A further quarter point rise was indicated, and has taken place. There was then some sign of a pause. On Tuesday 13th September, presumably reflecting official briefing, the Financial Times had the front page story beginning as quoted below with the confident prediction of a rate rise next week. The author, Andrew Balls, was evidently not one of my readers. Nor is Mr Greenspan, since the rise took place. A glance at my 10-year graph shows that this is almost unique. After a 4-week hesitation, the market resumed the trend rate with which it had led the Fed from April 2004 until two months ago. It did this so vigorously that it was as if the 4-week pause in the 3mth rate, beginning around 12 August had not happened. Remember that this pause began at virtually the moment when the Fed had decreed a quarter point rise. The rise was so strong and sustained that there was an unmistakeable signal for another Fed step-up, duly acted upon. The rise continued unabated, with another rate rise on 16th December. Note that with one exception, the 3-month rate shows no step structure, although according to the conventional story, it is supposed to be responding to the official rate. On the contrary, the 3-month rate appears to have decided well in advance, in mid-April 2004, to rise, and apart from the exception already mentioned, has risen ceaselessly ever since. A check shows that during this 20-month period there have been only 4 weekly values which have not been greater than or equal to the value of the preceding week, and these occurred in two widely separated instances involving two successive weeks. A slackening of the rate of rise may now be setting in. However, perhaps the Fed is reading this website. They seem to be determined to show that the market is not demonstrably leading them. They are taking a punt. Another quarter point has been added (31 Jan 2006), more or less keeping pace with, rather than lagging, the market. However, in the terms normal to this site, there is now a signal from the market at this time (24.3.2006) that a further rise is virtually certain. And (28.3.2006) it took place. The rise continues unabated. The UK Financial Times (19.4.2006) devoted 48 column-inches to Fed wording interpreted as signalling only one more upwards step. Well, it has to stop some time, and although there had been signs of a slackening of pace, the upwards trend continued, and a further quarter point rise seemed (23.6.2006) inevitable. This duly took place on 29.6.2006. Since then, the market rate rose only a little, and has now dipped markedly for the first time since April 2004! So the UK example is not being followed here. Media column-inches on the non-action or likely action of the Fed has been empty space-filling. There is no real signal for change, but the immediate trend seems to be down.

As from 11 Feb 2005, an approximate indication of the real (inflation adjusted) 3-month interest rate is given. It appears to have been negative for a couple of years.

* Or might it be a case of the old joke - I must get in front of this mob because I am their leader?

Press comment:

Financial Times 13th September 2005
"The US Federal Reserve is set to press ahead with its campaign of raising interest rates at its meeting next week, in spite of the economic impact of Hurricane Katrina. But there is expected to be intense discussion of whether substantial changes to the wording of the accompanying policy statement are needed."

Financial Times 11th June 2004
"Mr Greenspan seemed to state the obvious when he said the Fed would do "what is required" to curb US inflation. But allowing for the ambiguities of central banker-speak, was he perhaps giving a hint that the Fed planned a more aggressive-than-expected monetary tightening?"

This insight adds nothing to what could be seen here at that date.

Financial Times 28th June 2004
"Fed officials appear comfortable with the path of interest rates investors have priced in and pleased that financial markets have tightened financial conditions pre-emptively".

This appeared among the column-feet of vacuous, fact-free, comment in the FT in the days preceding the Fed bank-rate change. It is an ingenious way of asserting that the Fed leads, but from behind! With an audience like this, the assertion that the bank leads qualifies in Popperian terms as an unfalsifiable one, since in all cases, the central bank leads, either according to the visible evidence of lagging 3-month rates, or, if not, the "financial markets" are said to have followed the bank's lead "pre-emptively", i.e., in advance. Such an assertion, inherently incapable of being demonstrated or denied, is, in objective terms, pointless.

Financial Times 9th November 2004
"Sir, in your editorial “Onwards and upwards, for now” (November 6) you appear to endorse without reserve the Fed’s picture of Mr. Greenspan more or less single-handedly conducting the American economy with wise and deft touches to interest rates. You state that he has unexpectedly refrained from giving Mr. Bush “a helping hand by holding down interest rates”, as if he could personally have decided to keep the Fed funds rate at 1 percent for the last four months.

"The facts do not support this. The 3-month US$ Libor rate whose daily movements are tabulated daily in the FT, having remained fairly steady from mid-June 2003 till early April 2004, turned decisively upwards on that date, and it has risen more or less continually since, by 1.1 percentage points, from 1.11 percent to 2.21 percent.

"This decisive rise began 90 days before the Fed made its first quarter point rise at the end of June, and had progressed by half a percentage point by then. Since the Fed has so far responded by a three-quarter-point rise to the market signal of 1.1 points, clearly, as your editorial noted, “another quarter-point is expected next week”.

"It strains credulity that the Fed is dictating interest rates. The bare numerical evidence over the years suggests that it is not even a player, but maybe that is an over-simplification. Walter Stanners"

This letter, as far as is known, provoked no comment, positive or negative, during the following days.





Graph 3 - EU

Apparent tendency:
The downward tendency has halted. The last period since June 2003 has been by far the most stable in the period covered by the graph. After more than two years of signalling "no change", there was a sudden and sharp step-up in the 3mth rate, beginning late September. The signal was strong enough to dictate a one-quarter point rise in the base rate, and this took place. A look at the graph confirms that the pattern (a 2-month sustained signal)is normal. The unusual aspect is the unprecedentedly stable 2-year plateau from which this sudden rise took place. Although there was not a definite pointer to a further base rate change, there was a sustained trend upwards, beginning in late September 2005. A quarter-point base rate change took place on 2.3.2006 in response. The 3-month rate rise continued. A quarter point rate rise was predicted here, and occurred on 8.6.2006. A further steady rise took place. According to the criteria used here, the signal for a rise of base rate was still not compelling, but a quarter-point rise took place on 3 Aug. Nevertheless, in contrast to the UK situation, the EU central bank is very clearly following the market lead, and another quarter-point rise has duly taken place. The trend is still up, enough for a quarter-point (rather premature) base rate rise on 7th Dec.

As from 11 Feb 2005, an approximate indication of the real (inflation adjusted) 3-month interest rate is given.

Press comment:

Financial Times 13th January 2006
Under the headline, "Trichet signals rises in rates", the following appeared. "Jean Claude Trichet added: 'everyone knows that we act when necessary'. Financial markets, which expect a further quarter point rise in March, had 'pretty well captured' the ECB's message", he said.

This seems now to be the standard line, as was remarked above in connection with the US. It means that Trichet accepts the contention of this web-page that the central bank's base rate changes do not lead, but are led by, prior market changes. The ingenious defence is that these prior market changes are themselves led by the regular gnomic and carefully staged utterances or "messages" of the central bank chief. It is as if the man who says "it looks like rain" was to claim afterwards that he caused the subsequent rainfall.





Addendum on a statistical numerical point

Note that a fairly lengthy section, originally included under this title, has been transferred to the note, "The function of the central bank", a link to which is given below.

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Links to other papers


THE FUNCTION OF THE CENTRAL BANK

WoPEc - Working papers in economics - WUSTL January 2002 Paper in pdf form

Abstract. The general view of the media, bankers, business and politicians, not noticeably contradicted by academics, is that one of the main functions, or the main function, of the central bank is to analyse the progress of the economy, and then to steer it with skilful judgement towards health and growth, by making decisions to change their base interest rate, with carefully chosen timing, amount and direction. The data presented here show that it is impossible to sustain this notion of skilful time-critical steering, or even that the central bank does in fact lead or determine the short term interest rates available to savers or business. The contrary proposition, that commercial short-term interest rates are in fact observed and followed by the central bank, is mathematically sustainable, and generally in accord with the observed facts.
Paper in HTML form


IS LOW INFLATION AN IMPORTANT CONDITION FOR HIGH GROWTH?

Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 17 No. 1 1993

Abstract. It seems rash even to raise the question in the title. The universal belief is that the answer is and must be "yes". Yet factual evidence for this belief is curiously lacking, maybe even felt to be unnecessary. This paper takes what is thought to be all the, not very voluminous, post-war factual data which exists and which may bear on the matter, and treats this data in every plausible way to find if any convincing demonstration is possible that low inflation is associated with high long term growth rate in GNP. This includes special attention to Germany, the country which is the popular (and sole) paradigm among UK authorities and commentators. The paper concludes that no such demonstration is possible.
Paper in HTML form


INFLATION AND GROWTH

Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 20 No. 4 1996

Abstract. In a previous paper, the author concluded that there was no evidence that low inflation was associated with improved growth rate. In this note, he examines a paper by R. J. Barro which tends to the opposing view. He suggests that the evidence of this paper in fact reinforces his conclusion.
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GROWTH IS NOT CORRELATED WITH INFLATION

WoPEc - Working papers in economics - WUSTL March 1998 Paper in pdf form

Abstract. In a previous paper, the author concluded that there was no evidence that low inflation was associated with improved growth rate. In a later note, he examined a paper by R. J. Barro which tended to the opposing view, and suggested that the evidence of that paper in fact reinforced his conclusion. In this note he comments on a paper by W. R. J. Alexander, concluding that time series analysis, especially with additional variables as in this paper, is unlikely to be able to contradict cross-section results.
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THE ABSENCE FROM PUBLIC DISCOURSE OF EVALUATIONS OF GDP BASED ON PURCHASING POWER

Abstract.     Politicians, journalists - commentators on economic matters generally - evolve a sort of quasi-stable rhetoric. They select two or three foreign countries with which they like to compare their own, either as models to be followed, or traps to be avoided. Other countries are rarely or never mentioned. They repeat over and over again mantras such as "we are the fourth largest economy in the world" in the UK, or variants of "the dot.com revolution" or "the new paradigm" in the USA. In arguments in the UK over the replacement of sterling by the Euro, it is almost a daily occurrence to hear growth in the UK contrasted with recession in Eurozone Germany. It appears likely that these stories emerge in part from appraisals of GDP expressed for the purpose of cross-country comparison in a currency unit (the Euro or dollar, say) calculated at the ruling rate of exchange. This calculation can be done instantly. It is "news". The more recent method of using purchasing power is much more complex and its results are published late. They are not "news", and do not affect the established rhetoric. Nevertheless, they are the truth, or as near to that as economic data can be, and often quite strikingly at variance with the current story.
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DE-INDUSTRIALISATION

WoPEc - Working papers in economics - WUSTL January 1996 Paper in pdf form

Abstract. The notion of de-industrialisation arises from the fact that industrial employment, having risen rapidly, is now in equally rapid decline. This paper presents the view that agriculture and industry together form, and have always formed, a "primary" sector which from the beginning, because of its inherent capacity for productivity gains, has progressively freed labour for non-productive work. The "industrial" revolution was really a "primary sector" (in the above sense) revolution. There is no new phenomenon of de-industrialisation, merely a speeding up of a process of labour-freeing from the primary sector, whose ever decreasing work force produces ever increasing output.
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ABSTRACTIONS, THINGS, WEALTH, AND DEINDUSTRIALIZATION

WoPEc - Working papers in economics - WUSTL April 1998 Paper in pdf form

Abstract. Economic theory is dominated by abstract structures. Underneath, there is no firm foundation. Above, there is a lack of rigorous confrontation with established fact. Basic theoretical concepts have no acknowledged definition. The apparatus of graphs, algebra and technical vocabulary are often vehicles for rhetoric rather than descriptions of truth. In this abstract world, it seems to be accepted without embarrassment that all opinions are possible, while adopting the style of science in delivering each conclusion as if it was a fact. The closest parallel is perhaps with theology, where also each practitioner presents his story as fact, but there are differing stories. This paper illustrates this theme, with particular reference to "deindustrialization".

It points out that it is tangible things which are the primary measure, literally the sine qua non, of all material, cultural and intellectual progress. Official statistics necessarily aggregate market transactions involving tangibles and intangibles at monetary exchange values. However it is an error, in the sense of being a misperception leading to wrong action, to mistake this equivalencing of things and non-things as more than a necessary procedural fiction. In this system, one opera performance equals, say, 100 lorryloads of gravel, but the logical reality is that gravel is part of the primary inventory, opera and all other intangibles are secondary or consequential. This inversion of the important and the estimable lies behind the paradox of the deindustrialization which is in process and the deagriculturalization which has already run its course in some parts of the world - namely that our entire civilisation rests (and logically and factually must always rest) on the output of this (in employment terms) disappearing sector. Eventually, the sector which ultimately produces all value will appear in the statistics as one which adds zero value in current terms. Fortunately, the real word of affairs shows no sign of acting on this erroneous perception. For those accustomed to see the world in abstractions, misperceptions still seem to obscure the reality.
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DE-INDUSTRIALISATION II

WoPEc - Working papers in economics - WUSTL July 2001 Paper in pdf form

Abstract: Is industrial production relatively in decline? No, it is not. This note displays the evidence that for the last 40 years, in the 6 largest economies of the world, industrial production has kept pace with total output.
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DE-INDUSTRIALISATION III

WoPEc - Working papers in economics - WUSTL December 2002 Paper in pdf form

Abstract:     The author of this note takes it as self evident that prosperity and the provision of "things" (buildings, roads, furniture, furnishings, clothes, machines and equipment of all sorts) go together. The way people generally speak and act is in line with this view. If this is so, domestic manufacturing must continually keep pace with gross domestic product, provided that the necessary "things" are not imported from elsewhere. However, many people are persuaded that domestic manufacturing is in terminal decline, and that the lost output is being replaced by imports from the developing world. Almost daily, one may read of manufacturing jobs being "exported" to the Far East. However, it is simply impossible to import goods without a more or less balancing volume of exports, and there is in reality limited scope for exporting a sufficient volume of services. Imports of goods must more or less be balanced by the export of domestically produced goods. How can a widespread perception of decline be reconciled with a reality of growth? The answer is that the "decline" which is perceived is a decline in employment in the industrial sector, but this decline is more than counterbalanced by the rise of productivity, so that the domestic output of goods by and large keeps pace with the growth of GDP. This note summarises the statistical evidence for the accuracy of this view. A substantial footnote discusses the role of journalists and academics in sustaining the perception of the decline of manufacturing.
Paper in HTML form


A LOGICAL VACUUM
- Reading notes on Keynes' The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936

Abstract:
When Pigou vigorously attacked Keynes immediately the General Theory was published, he wrote that, “since a detailed running commentary would be both tedious and un-illuminating, I shall not adopt that method”. These reading notes follow precisely this tedious route. The truth cannot always be entertaining. Keynes was one of the most fluent and plausible rhetoricians of his age, and it could be argued that his work can be examined only by dismantling his rhetoric line by line to expose the total logical vacuum which in cold objective fact the General Theory is.

Keynes’ book was seemingly written at speed, contains no bibliography, virtually no mention of factual data, little evidence, pseudo-algebra only for appearances, no attempt at anything which could be called scientific method. His acknowledged greatness lay in his cleverness, and his great skill as a debater, negotiator, journalist, and politician, not at all in his ability or interest in searching out the truth. His “theory” is presented in terms of mechanistic cause-and-effect models of economic society, but quite demonstrably, these models are based on nothing but the repetitious re-statement of Keynes’s prior and evidence-free conviction that the cure for unemployment and recession is to stimulate spending, any spending, useful or useless, either by individuals or by governments. Keynes used every rhetorical trick imaginable to hide the empty centre of his work, from “as I shall show … ” onwards. His mainstay, as Pigou remarked, was a deliberate lack of precision and clarity. The great sociological mystery is - how did this transparently fact-free “theory” sweep everything before it?
Paper in HTML form


ESSAY ON BAYES

WoPEc - Working papers in economics - WUSTL June 1999 Paper in pdf form

Abstract. It has been said, fairly plausibly, that "Bayesian inference is one of the most widely known eponyms in all of science". But unlike common scientific eponyms, it is by no means clear exactly what "Bayesian" means, and what it has to do with Bayes. "Bayesian", and the dozen or so words and phrases which are usually associated with it, seem to be more like unspecific words of the English language, deployed by an author as he wishes, rather than fixed technical terms. The obscurity of the language, relative to the precise meanings associated with, say, Newton's laws or Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, is matched by the obscurity of the history - the virtually unknown Bayes, the posthumous paper, the impenetrable and incoherent style, the muddled logic, the virtual silence on his work for 200 years, the sudden emergence in the last several decades, not of new knowledge, but of new Bayesian additions to the vocabulary. This note surveys the notions and the history. It concludes that the Bayesian vocabulary is vague and pretentious, and serves no useful purpose.
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WITTGENSTEIN & RUSSELL - GIANT PYGMIES
Reading notes on the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Abstract:
    Wittgenstein and Russell both in their different ways showed that they believed that ultimately, there were better things to do with one’s life than study or talk about philosophy. Both were remarkable men. The words of both appear in the English translation of the Tractatus, Russell’s in his introduction to Wittgenstein’s book. This note comments on these words, almost one at a time. The lack of clarity, logic and coherence of both authors raises the puzzling question – in what does greatness lie? Is it in personality, debating skill, membership of a mutually admiring elite? This note discovers nothing of interest or importance in anything actually written between the covers of this book. The note is essentially reading notes, as was my note on Keynes’ General Theory. I recall that when Keynes’ friend and rival, Pigou, vigorously attacked Keynes immediately the General Theory was published, he wrote that, “since a detailed running commentary would be both tedious and un-illuminating, I shall not adopt that method”. The notes below follow precisely this tedious route. The truth cannot always be entertaining. Pigou chose to challenge Keynes on the latter’s home ground, as a debater, a predictably hopeless task. For Wittgenstein, as for Keynes, I might argue that his work can be examined only by dismantling his rhetoric line by line to lay bare its lack of discipline, of coherence, of logical development, and of content.
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Notes on REDMAN, ECONOMICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Abstract:
These are critical notes made while reading Deborah A Redmans's "Economics and the Philosophy of Science". The philosophy is largely that of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. Redman begins in the style of a neutral reporter, but later shows her impatience with the confusions sown by those eminent people. Hutchison supplies the main sceptical comments. My main comment is that neither Redman, nor the philosophers she quotes, appear to recognise that it is simply impossible to discuss "science" if the unstated assumption is that science is whatever anyone chooses to call science. One has to start with the strikingly observed worldwide unanimity of physicists and chemists within their respective disciplines, and take account of the fall-off of unanimity (that is, the widening scope for disagreement) as one moves through biology, medicine, etc. (that is, as the matters studied become more and more complex). Economists are in the absurd situation of claiming to be scientists, or at least, wanting to appear to be scientific, when the matters they study are simply too complex ever to lead to consensus. The absurdity is demonstrated when, for example, Friedman is cited in this book as claiming that there is no fundamental distinction between economics and the physical sciences. At the other end of the spectrum, historians and philosophers do well to ply their trade without making inappropriate claims of objectivity.
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Franz Grillparzer    DER ARME SPIELMANN   

This is my own translation of a work which appears from the bibliography to have a significant English-speaking audience, but of which there seems to be no readily accessible English version.
English translation


THE PIPEDREAM OF E O WILSON’S "CONSILIENCE"

Abstract:
E O Wilson’s book "Consilience" is a notably unscientific plea for science to take over the so-called social sciences, from economics to psychology, and extend also into art and religion. The text rambles on, with exalted brilliance according to one reviewer, over this whole field, but the brilliance sheds no new light, and fails to explain exactly what consilience is, how it might be achieved, and what benefit would result if any of these subjects (for example, art) was connected back to genes, biology, chemistry and finally physics. It is not mentioned that such a connection to the "harder" sciences is in any case a pipedream.
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